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ABSTRACT
Based on testimonials of migration journeys of indigenous
Cañaris from southern highland Ecuador, this paper examines
strategies of mobility and social networking employed by
migrants and facilitators in the human smuggling market.
Following a series of economic crises in the late 1990s,
Ecuadorian transnational migration increased significantly,
with a 55.5 percent increase to the United States between
2000 and 2008, and staggering 12,150 percent increase to
Spain between 1998 and 2005. This article focuses on the
growth of a regional migration industry in the southern high-
land region, and pays special attention to the roles of indigen-
ous Cañari migrants and migration merchants. The guiding
questions are: how does indigeneity figure in mobility strate-
gies; in what ways is indigenous identity strategically
employed in the migration journey; and how might indigenous
migration merchants contribute to the expansion of migration?
As migration routes become increasingly dangerous, migrants
and human smuggling actors employ more innovative and
riskier strategies. I contend that while indigenous identity
may be used strategically and allow migrants to forge new
transnational social networks, indigenous migrants struggle for
legibility in the face of ethnic and linguistic discrimination, in
communities of origin, along migratory routes, and in migra-
tion destinations.
The tragic story of twelve-year-old Noemi Álvarez Quillay, which made
international news in April 2014, drew long-overdue attention to the unfold-
ing humanitarian crisis of the rapidly growing numbers of young migrants en
route to the United States. Her untimely death highlighted the extreme level
of fear, insecurity, and trauma that migrants experience in the migration
journey. It also shed light on the dangerously inept system of national and
international immigration controls throughout Central America and Mexico.
Over the first half of 2014, detention centres throughout the Central
American region, in Mexico, and in the southern United States were over-
whelmed with the number of cases of young unaccompanied children.
Despite enormous efforts by migrant shelters and other organisations
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working with migrants-en-route, the sequence of events that led to Noemi’s
tragic end is not unusual. Travelling alone, Noemi departed Tambo, Ecuador,
and was en route to New York City, where both of her parents have lived
since she was three years old. Authorities detained her in Juárez, Mexico, and
sadly her journey ended in a local children’s shelter.
The present article draws from testimonials and ethnographic material
collected during dissertation fieldwork in Tambo, in the Cañar province of
southern highland Ecuador, the community where Noemi grew up, and
through contact with families there and with family members in the
New York/New Jersey area. My research highlights instances in which indi-
genous identity figures in mobility strategies and explores how it can be
strategically employed as part of the migration industry. Whereas Kyle and
Goldstein showed that migration from the Azuayo region (which includes
the Azuay and Cañar provinces) constituted a regional migration industry,
they pay less attention to the importance of indigeneity as a form of social
capital which indigenous migration merchants (as intermediaries and facil-
itators) have mobilised within their social networks and intermediary
organisations.1 My research shows that identity, as discussed by indigenous
migrants and migration merchants, does shape opportunities and strategies
both en route and in recruitment by coyotes (Spanish term for migrant
facilitator). This research thus contributes to a deeper understanding of
mobility strategies within the migration industry.2
Migration Routes
Prior to her death, Noemi was previously detained in Nicaragua during
her first migration attempt, where she was held for two months. She
returned to Ecuador, was reunited with her paternal grandparents, with
whom she had lived since her parents’ departure, and returned to school.
Shortly thereafter, her parents contracted the same coyote to arrange
another attempt. Despite her reluctance and that of her grandparents,
Noemi left Tambo a second time, travelling for six weeks until she was
detained in Mexico. Authorities detained the coyote and the child on
suspicion of unauthorised migration and brought Noemi to a children’s
shelter, La Casa de Esperanza (House of Hope). According to accounts,
migration officials interviewed her in a closed room with no other witness
present. Afterwards a counsellor noted that she appeared to be in a state of
terror and shelter staff reported that she cried night and day. Clearly none
of her caretakers fully comprehended the level of trauma she felt. Two
days after the interrogation, on March 7, 2014, she committed suicide in
the bathroom, using the cloth shower curtain as a noose. Her parents were
unable to return to Ecuador for her funeral services because of their
undocumented status in the United States.
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Officials launched an investigation shortly after her death to verify if it was
a suicide or if it had been coerced or staged. Investigators and journalists
questioned whether a twelve-year-old was psychologically capable of this
kind of action. Evidence confirmed the initial cause of death and they closed
the investigation shortly thereafter. While public outcry over the incident in
part directed blame at the parents for subjecting their daughter to the risky
journey, overwhelmingly suspicion and blame has been placed on the inter-
rogators, who are thought to have prompted her extreme level of distress.
Other than the interrogators, no one can be certain what they used to coerce
her to give them information. Perhaps they threatened her family members
in the United States or even those in Ecuador.3 Did she even fully compre-
hend her rights during the interrogation? The Secretary of the Network for
the Rights of Children, José Luis Flores Cervantes, stated that Juárez city
officials, by neglecting to have a witness in the room, violated international
norms and protocols put in place to protect vulnerable populations, which
includes children en route to the United States.4 The poor handling of this
case by both migration officials and workers at the shelter highlight that
while international standards may exist, in practice there is a dangerous
absence of training and enforcement of protocols.
In July 2014, the Ecuadorian Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Human Mobility, María Landázuri, gave a press conference in
which she declared that the case had not followed the Convention of the
Rights of Children, citing that the Ecuadorian government had not been
notified upon Noemí’s detention but only after her death.5 This break
between protocols and enforcement at the local level plagues many of the
intervening countries along the migration route. Investigations over the
following eleven months led to the arrests of forty-two people involved in
her transport. In February 2015, investigations concluded that she had been
sexually abused prior to her death. Speculation about the intentional with-
holding of evidence of sexual abuse further escalated debate about the role of
the organisations involved in her detainment and autopsy.6
Ecuadorian Migration and the 2000 Debt Crisis
In late 1999 and early 2000, Ecuador underwent a significant economic crisis.
After months of fluctuating oil prices (the leading export of the country), a
widespread banking crisis and the drastic devaluation of the national cur-
rency, the Ecuadorian government, following the lead of former president
Jamil Mahuad, dollarised the economy, adopting the US dollar as the legal
tender. Prior to the dollarisation, bank accounts were frozen and many
financial institutions closed. People lost savings, investments, and businesses,
and inflation continued to increase even as unemployment soared.7 Many
Ecuadorians turned to international migration in search of better
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opportunities. While Ecuadorian migration to the United States can be traced
back to the late 1960s, migration increased significantly in the first few years
of the new millennium. Migration to Spain, Italy, and, to a lesser extent,
Germany and Russia, surpassed migration to the United States. In Spain
alone, the Ecuadorian population soared from 4,000 in 1998 to 490,000 in
2005, a staggering 12,150 percent increase.8 In the United States, the
Ecuadorian population grew from 392,045 in 2000 to 609,762 in 2008, a
55.5 percent increase.9
In response to the exodus, the Ecuadorian government established a
Ministry of Migration that later evolved into the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Human Mobility. Consular offices were established in destina-
tions with high concentrations of migrants, including more states throughout
the United States, in Spain, Italy, and Germany. The Ecuadorian government
established three consular offices in Mexico, in response to the increasing
numbers of Ecuadorians detained en route. The government has further
elaborated a Law on Human Mobility, which would serve as an umbrella
for all legislation regarding immigration, including regional migration to
Ecuador, predominantly from Colombia and Peru. The emergence of institu-
tions and legislation, which directly responded to the migration crisis, sup-
ports the argument Nyberg Sørensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen make which
contends that the migration industry is not only about the facilitators and
intermediaries but the rise in legislation and state offices to contend with the
mobility and international detention of their citizens.10
Between 2000 and 2010, most Ecuadorian migrants travelling to the
United States followed a route which began with a seven- to eight-day
journey by sea and later – for two to three months – over land by car,
truck, train, motorcycles, and foot. Since 2010, many migrants are able to fly
to Central America, primarily to Honduras, and begin the journey over land.
It is a route marked with danger, precariousness, and fear. Terrible stories
abound, as friends and neighbours return from unsuccessful attempts and
share their experiences. Routes and borders are increasingly policed by
national migration control agencies, as well as drug cartels, and people
undertake greater risks in search of alternative passage. Upon arriving in
Honduras, Guatemala or Mexico, travelling is interspersed with prolonged
periods of waiting, as smugglers await updates on opportunities for passage
or the arrival of payments. Once the migrants finally cross over into the
United States, they continue on to their final destinations of New York,
Minneapolis, Oregon, or California, depending on where they may have
contacts. The journey is an immense undertaking, but it is only the beginning
of a life-changing experience for the migrant, and for the family and
acquaintances left behind.
For young Noemi, her profound level of desperation is difficult to com-
prehend but the context out of which she was migrating typified the limited
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opportunities available to many young indigenous girls. Her journey brought
her through a myriad of contacts with migrant facilitators, detention officials,
not-for-profit centres, the series of intermediary institutions that constitute
the meso-structure of the migration industry, yet they all failed to safeguard
her from the harsh isolation and fear induced by the migration industry.11
Her parents made the decision based on their perception of these limited
opportunities and in the hopes of reunifying their family where they had
established a new home. Indigeneity may not have figured into her migration
experience in any strategic way but it certainty shaped the context out of
which she migrated. As a young indigenous girl from a rural area, Noemi’s
level of vulnerability along the route would have been extreme. Her story
stands as inspiration for this analysis of the experiences of other indigenous
migrants in the clandestine migration journey.
Migration Industry and Regimes of Mobility
There are two emerging literatures on contemporary international migration
that move beyond previous approaches to understand human mobility in a
globalised world. While not mutually exclusive, both migration industry
scholars and mobility studies scholars highlight dimensions of migration
that have been underanalysed in previous scholarship.12 Scholars who use
migration industry as a conceptual frame analyse the vast social and eco-
nomic networks of migration facilitators and mobility management, and the
institutions involved in migration control, such as legalisation, detention, and
deportation. Scholars who engage with mobility studies emphasise mobility
as part of a broader set of practices within and prior to widespread interna-
tional migration. These scholars examine all forms of migration: tourism,
business, education, and labour, as well as immobility, in order to capture the
intersection of mobility practices, dispossession, and power disparities. Both
approaches concede that components of a migration industry have existed in
earlier historical periods but contend that contemporary migration has
reached a scale unforeseen. While it is beyond the scope of this article to
work through an in-depth comparison of the two analytic approaches, the
case of indigenous migration would certainly benefit from a hybrid approach
of the two. As we understand the formal and informal institutions and actors
in migration facilitation and detention, the international attention to high-
risk routes, it is important to understand mobility as a practice that predates
current institutions and borders.
Indigenous Migrations
In order to better understand how indigenous migrants strategise and adapt
in order to cope with increasingly difficult conditions in the migration
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journey, I examine cases in which indigeneity provided an opportunity for
passage and social mobility in order to tease out the instrumentality of
migrant strategies. I contend that transnational social networking based on
shared indigenous identity may materialise as more indigenous migrants
from Latin America pass through the largely indigenous regions of Central
America. In the case of migration merchants, a term used by David Kyle to
describe a particular transnational mobility strategy, social connections and
opportunities arise out of their participation in the migration industry
through front-staging their identity to facilitate collaborations and encourage
investments.13 At the same time, ethnicity may render groups more vulner-
able to exploitation due to linguistic barriers and ethnic discrimination as in
cases where coyotes use them as a ‘sacrificial’ group in order to divert
attention from other groups and allow them to pass.14 Further, while indi-
genous entrepreneurs may emerge from migrant communities, the for-profit
nature of the business often results in a social distancing, much like that
described by Hernández León in his work with camionteros in Mexico, a
situation which arose during fieldwork, as described herein, and in later
conversations about migrant experiences with coyotes from the community.15
Kyle’s ethnographic work in Ecuador throughout the 1990s culminated in
the publication of Transnational Peasants in 2003.16 Kyle conducted a com-
parative ethnographic study in highland Ecuador and formulated two cate-
gories of migrants that drew attention to the “radically different economic
strategies of transnational mobility.”17 These two groups of migrants, migra-
tion merchants and merchant migrants, typified, respectively, strategies
among rural, indigenous migrants from the province of Azuay, just south
of Cañar, and in the northern Andean region of Pichincha, working mostly
with Otavaleño migration merchants. Migration merchants facilitated aspects
of the migration journey, whether they were enganchadores (recruiters),
chulqueros (money-lenders), or coyotes. Merchant migrants mostly referred
to Otavaleño migrants who travelled internationally to sell artisan goods and
music. Working in the same southern region, I examine what has taken place
over the last ten years, among the groups he classified as migration mer-
chants. My work engages with his stated goal to “explore the ‘multiple
conjunctural’ causes of migration operating simultaneously at several levels
of analysis. For example, the same ‘variable’ of ethnic identity may be socially
constructed differently at local, national, and international levels but can
nevertheless be seen to shape migration at each of those levels.”18 At the
time of the publication of his book, Kyle noted that more indigenous
migrants from the southern region were participating following the dramatic
upsurge in international Ecuadorian migration in 2000.
Ecuadorian scholars have carefully studied transnational migration within
rural and urban communities but they have only recently begun to analyse
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indigenous migration in particular.19 US-based researchers, Pribilsky and
Jokisch,20 conducted research in the same southern region where Kyle had
worked. Their work, respectively, looks at the forms of social stratification
caused by increased migration on transformations within family organisa-
tions and agrarian practices. Weismantel contributed to this debate in her
analysis on the impact of transnational migration in urban Cuenca, the third
largest city in Ecuador, on the ways in which access to remittances destabi-
lised social hierarchies and challenged racialised ideologies among privileged
elites.21 The narratives herein show that indigenous identity can also facilitate
mobility throughout the journey and within the communities of origin.
For many indigenous groups, migration is not a new phenomenon, but
rather part of a long history of mobility which includes movement along
trade routes, circular migration or simply a result of national borders being
delineated across their territories. This has been the case in the Amazonian
border regions between Ecuador, Peru and Brazil and certainly in other
nations and regions with large indigenous populations and throughout the
globe as national boundaries were delineated across regional territories. The
long history of indigenous migration in Southern Ecuador includes various
forms: predating the arrival of Spanish colonisers, Incan rulers strategically
relocated indigenous groups throughout the empire in order to dissuade
uprisings (known as mitimae) and conducted trade across wide expanses
throughout the highlands and Amazonian regions in what John V. Murra
termed “vertical archipelagos.”22 Indigenous people have laboured as cargo
bearers for intraregional trade for centuries and been instrumental in the
construction of railways and roadways throughout Ecuador. Within the
twentieth century, it has included seasonal migration from the highlands to
the coast; rural to urban migration; settlement programmes in the Amazon;
as well as international migration primarily to the United States, Spain, Italy
and Germany.
International migration and access to remittances have blurred the social
and geographic markers of class, ethnicity, and privilege in these rural high-
land communities.23 Arjun Appadurai recognised mobility within the context
of globalisation as creating a “new order of instability in the production of
modern subjects.”24 Indigenous Cañaris, often wearing the wide-brimmed
white hats associated with agrarian life, are now commonly seen in the
driver’s seats of new pick-up trucks transporting goods and people through
town. By the mid-2000s, indigenous coyotes and prestamistas now have a
significant role in the lucrative informal economy of the migration industry,
which mestizo elites have long dominated. These changes suggest an impor-
tant shift in the socio-economic and ethnic stratification between mestizo
elites and indigenous and rural workers. Within the indigenous commu-
nities, social stratification has increased between households with migrant
members abroad and those without.25 The inflation in costs of goods and for
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services due to the influx of remittances, among other factors, has also
generated greater divisions. However, even migrant households are not
guaranteed an improved financial status given the unstable flow of remit-
tances, high level of debt, and heightened tensions among family members
left behind.26
While I did not work with Noemi’s family, many spoke of a family in a
very similar situation in Tambo, an increasing occurrence in the region. As
migration becomes more common, frequently both young parents will
migrate, leaving the grandparents, aunts, uncles, and other extended kin, as
the caretakers of children left behind. In general, despite the symbolic marker
of success in the form of a modern style home, people criticised the family’s
arrangement and used them as an example for how migration caused the
disintegration of the family values and parenting within the largely indigen-
ous community. This negative perception of the family stands in contrast to a
perceived solidarity based on ethnic identity and in fact, the situation was
used as a counterpoint in the imaginary of an ideal indigenous family model
that merited membership and actively participated in the indigenous com-
munity. Even those households that contributed to the fees incurred by their
lack of participation in community-level projects (mingas), largely due to the
absence of multiple family members, were cast in a less favourable light as
people reflected on their absence over shared meals during said projects.
These community acts grew in significance for those that participated even as
they made the absence of members more apparent.
Noemi and her cousins resided together in a partially constructed casa fría
(cold house) on the family property close to the grandparents’ adobe house.
Cold houses, a local moniker for the cement block and rebar construction
style, dot the landscape in the region as families invest remittances in modern
style homes. The multiple-story buildings with large windows stand in sharp
contrast to the single-level, thick wall construction style of previous decades
whose design retained precious heat during the brisk highland evenings
unlike the ‘cold’ modern ones. My research findings supported Boccagni’s
assessment that the housing became both symbolic markers of migrant
success and of their absence.27 The adopted name also suggests the antithesis
of a home, devoid of warmth, settlement, and family. For many, these houses
symbolise success and prestige, a marker of visible social mobility previously
unattainable due to institutional and social barriers. These houses often
remain partially constructed due to intermittent remittances, and as such,
stand as stark reminders of the absent migrant members. More often than
not the remaining family members occupy the first floor until construction is
complete. In Noemi’s case, the children slept in the new house but still ate
most meals with the grandparents in their home. These accounts suggest that
instead of forging a sense of solidarity through shared dilemmas presented by
absent migrants, the dominant disparaging discourse around migrant
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abandonment contributed to the isolation of the family even among those
that remained and continued to participate in the community.
Migration Testimonials
The following section draws on the stories of indigenous Cañari migrants
from the canton of El Tambo, the region where I conducted my fieldwork.
For each of them, indigenous ethnic identity figures in their experience in
different ways. While regional and national identity helped create bonds with
others while en route, instances of solidarity based on indigenous identity
surfaced at different times within their accounts. Indigeneity became a
performative identity that allowed indigenous migrants from Latin America
to ‘pass’ as members of local indigenous groups, by adopting clothing style
and linguistic terms, in order to trick migration officials who are most often
mono-lingual Spanish speakers. This form of ‘passing’ allows migrants to
move through policed areas with more ease as ethnic discrimination renders
indigenous peoples less visible to immigration officials. This strategy is
supported by coyotes that stock clothing at safe houses and recruit local
indigenous travellers to help the migrants blend in with local groups.28
From Migrante to Enganchador (From Migrant to Recruiter)
When José, a young indigenous man from highland Cañar, first attempted to
migrate to the United States in May 2001, he arranged his travel with a coyote
in Cuenca, the third largest city in Ecuador, a two-hour bus ride south from
his hometown. He began his journey at night and travelled the six hours by
bus to the Pacific coastal town of Manta. Before sunrise in the morning,
nearly one hundred hopeful immigrants waited on the beach for the small
dinghy to bring them out to a larger fishing vessel. Once they commenced
the journey on the tightly packed fishing boat, the hopeful migrants were
forced to wait in the fishing cargo holds during the daytime but were able to
spend the nights on deck. These water routes are increasingly patrolled by
United States coast guard as well as coast guards from Central American
countries. The cargo holds of fishing vessels serve as hiding spaces if another
ship is sighted at sea and often passengers will be held there throughout the
journey as a way to control the groups.
While there was no room to walk around, no violence or abuse occurred.
Food and water were scant. After seven arduous days at sea, the boat arrived
to the Guatemalan coast where the travellers were packed onto a truck. José
travelled through Guatemala and into Mexico over the next few weeks,
staying overnight or a few days at houses “like hostages” and then being
packed alternately into buses and pickup trucks, at one point walking for
over twelve hours across desert-like plains, followed by swimming/wading
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across rivers. The coyotes continually split people into smaller groups and
paired them with others as they slowly approached the United States border.
At certain points, in an area he referred to as “Tierra Blanca”, the group was
split into much smaller groups and given 3,500$ pesos (Mexican currency) so
they could pay the officials 200$ and later 500$ to each of the coyotes along
the way. The network through which the journey was financed alternated.
They were told to meet up at a hotel but two men, an uncle and nephew,
never arrived, which José attributed to their inability to read. The coyote
simply informed the group that they were ‘lost’. In the hotel there were
migrants from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Under cover of night,
the coyotes brought the group by bus to Aguas Calientes near the border and
reunited them with other Ecuadorians, twenty in total.
In this first attempt, José arrived in Texas after two and half months but
was immediately detained by US border officials. In the beginning, officials
asked them, “Who is Pancho Villa?” to determine if they were Mexican. After
they could not answer, they convinced the guards that he and others from
highland Ecuador were indigenous Guatemalans. While mestizo migrants
have engaged in the same strategic move through memorising maps of
villages, street names and popular figures, the ability of indigenous migrants
to use language to mask their national identity, especially when most migra-
tion officials are mono-lingual Spanish speakers, make their ruse more
convincing. I point to this “passing” strategy, made possible by the denigra-
tion of indigenous personhood across Central and Latin American regions, as
a form of mobilised invisibility. Ultimately José and his colleagues decided to
admit their national origin in order to be able to return to their homes after
such a long and arduous journey. He was kept in detention for three months,
unable to communicate with his family and passed the time with detainees
from Colombia and other parts of Ecuador. He was in this detention centre
when the twin towers fell. Ultimately he returned to Ecuador on 15 October.
Having already invested US$2,000 in the journey, José attempted to
migrate once more in 2003. He followed the same initial route in Ecuador
but this time the ship travelled all the way to the Mexican coast. Juan
recounted the horrific experience during his eight-day trip at sea. Not only
was there a shortage of food and water, but female travellers suffered from
incidences of violence and abuse, something that had not happened during
his first journey. The passengers were also kept below decks for the entire
trip. On the seventh day, a thirty-year-old man from Paute, a small town just
outside of Cuenca, committed suicide. He had been showing signs of distress
and the crew had him tied up but somehow he was able to escape. José
witnessed the incident and said that the man tore off his clothes and threw
himself off the ship. Since the man had never learned how to swim – being
from the highlands – he knew he would drown as soon as he jumped into the
water. The next day, the Mexican coast guard detained the ship and all the
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passengers were sent back to Ecuador. “He missed them by just one day…
one day,” José repeated in disbelief as we sat in a borrowed living room just
off the main road through Sisid, a small town outside of Cañar. José
attempted the journey one last time in 2005 but Ecuadorian officials detained
the group on the coast before they were even able to board the fishing vessel
on suspicion of attempting to migrate. After a brief interrogation, they were
then left to find their own bus fare to return to their hometowns.
José’s story shares similarities with the migration experiences of many
households in the highland regions of Ecuador. While José’s first attempt to
enter the United States ended in his detention and deportation, his subse-
quent attempts demonstrate the increasing vigilance on the part of the
Ecuadorian government and other countries throughout the region. José’s
story depicts the brutality of the migration journey but also the difficulties
faced and the sacrifices made by hopeful migrants in their quest for a better
quality of life. Unable to complete the journey, he now works as an engan-
chador, or recruiter, for the coyote in order to reduce his debt. Enganchadores
have been a part of the informal economy in the highlands for over fifty
years; previously labour recruiters from the coastal plantations would seek
seasonal workers in the same highland regions, touting better wages and
opportunities. Kyle (2003) describes similar incidences in his research and
frames this as a centuries-old institution of usurious middlemen in different
economic periods. Put another way, the economic collapse stimulated a
resurgence of subsistence strategies that rural and indigenous communities
have relied upon over decades. When indigenous migration merchants
entered the migration industry, they were initially viewed in a relatively
positive light. Even so, José expressed remorse and disdain for his position
but felt he had little choice since his debt was so high. What is interesting
about his story is the way in which he became ensnared in the migration
industry, working with a local coyote who recruited him to help increase his
clientele. There may not have been an immediate or apparent fashion in
which indigeneity created a moment of solidarity in his experience, but the
indigenous leadership in Cañar was working with José to get him more
involved in local community activities. By providing an alternative source
of income, the communities work with the non-governmental organisations
opened a possibility though networks based on his indigenous identity.
Migration ‘Sin Querer’ (‘Without Intent’)
In 2003, Segundo made his first attempt to migrate to the United States. He
worked in construction but had not been able to find work for a long time and his
family was struggling. He began his account with the statement that he migrated
without intent, sin querer. He explained that he started on the journey before
having decided to leave. He said that the money had been arranged and he felt
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compelled to go. Segundo’s description relegated his own sense of agency in the
decision-making process to those that arranged the journey. His account aligns
with both Kyle and Hernandez’s portrayal of migration merchants having an
incentivising impact on themigration flow. At the onset of his journey, he worked
with an enganchador from the small town of Sisid who travelled with him to the
coast where close to 200 people were brought out to another fishing vessel that
travelled eight days to the coast of Guatemala. The group was split apart once they
reached the coast and his group travelled by truck up to the mountains where a
family housed them for six days. The migrants were told to bathe and given
indigenous Guatemalan clothing. There were three separate groups with different
coyotes. They weren’t allowed to leave the premises and were hidden from sight.
Later the group was separated and they travelled on trikes, a common vehicle for
taxis, and were grouped with Guatemalans to further hide them from suspicion.
They arrived at another family home and were among forty–fifty others from
Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. From there they walked for hours and finally
sought shelter at an abandoned house. Ultimately officials detained them in
Tapachula, Mexico, where he was held for three weeks until they had enough
Ecuadorian migrants to fill the plane for their return.
Like José’s experience, Segundo mentioned that a few of his fellow travellers
were able to convince officials that they were Guatemalan but he chose to
return home. Segundo began his second attempt just one month after arriving
home. He travelled a similar route to Mexico, even staying at the same safe
houses until he was detained in the same region as before. He decided to forego
another attempt but later heard that those that did try one last time ultimately
did make it. Fortunately for Segundo, the coyote only charged him $700 instead
of the full $2000 initial payment of the usual $12,000 fee. In 2008, three of his
six children were in the United States and he was considering another attempt.
He had become more involved in local politics and was a representative for the
community for artisans and craft-workers. In this account, indigenous identity
again served as a mode of passing, a strategic performance, aimed at confusing
migration officials both during their travels through Guatemala and Mexico,
and even upon detainment. By convincing an official of their indigenous status,
Ecuadorians would not have to begin the migration route as far back but was
predicated on their ability to reconnect with the original coyote to which they
had paid initial fees and, for many, who also held titles to their family lands
(often used as collateral for initial loan). It was unclear from his testimonial how
that may have been arranged but Segundo maintained ties with the coyote as he
considered his next attempt.
Solidarity En Route
Santiago, an indigenous Cañari man in his late thirties, shared his migration
experience and how he successfully entered the United States after three
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attempts. Like the others, he worked with the same coyote that arranged all
three attempts. Generally the local coyotes would charge in installments and
only solicit the full fee once the migrant crossed into the United States
regardless if they were detained and deported afterwards. Santiago was
reluctant to share why he had returned to Ecuador but he had become very
active in the activities of the indigenous community; that is how we initially
met. We discussed his experience, which was similar to the others in terms of
the sea-to-land crossing. When asked whether he felt his indigenous identity
played a role in his migration experience, he shared the following encounter.
During his second attempt, he was staying at a safe house in Mexico and
reported that he had been approached by an indigenous Mexican coyote who
asked if he wanted to get into the business with him and not “let the mestizos
make all the money.” This level of compadrazgo (comradeship), or ethnic
solidarity, was touched upon in other migration stories shared by return
migrants in Ecuador and in informal conversations with migrants in the
New York City area. These migrants described learning indigenous
Guatemalan and Mayan terminology and wearing indigenous clothing. By
adopting the clothing, and in some cases, vocabulary, of an indigenous
group, Segundo and others he travelled with used indigeneity strategically
as a performative identity.29 By tapping into the mutual experience of
invisibility or at the very least ‘otherness’ of the indigenous groups by the
dominant society, migrants were able to avoid detection. In the last instance,
the Mexican coyote used indigenous identity as a basis for a potential
partnership against the mestizo migrant workers.
Indigenous Migration Merchants
A range of migration merchants profit by facilitating some aspect of the migration
process, such as money-lending, activities available to nearly all return migrants.
This brokering has reproduced the pyramidal structure of the straw hat export
economy, although this structure is more open to entrepreneurial migrants who
are not part of the local financial elite.30
Not just anyone could become a coyote. In the early days of migration,
only a few mestizo families occupied lucrative positions as informal money-
lenders and coyotes, mostly due to connections in the United States through a
migrant family member. As the epigraph describes, middle-class merchant
families, who had profited during the straw-hat economy prior to the decline
in the market in the mid-1960s, comprised the first wave of migrants to the
United States. As such they established and profited from the initial connec-
tions within the migration network. When indigenous migrants forged their
own social networks and connections and became coyotes in the early 2000s,
a critical shift occurred. Overall, indigenous community members welcomed
this shift. When people talked about the relationship to the indigenous
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coyotes and moneylender, there was an implicit expectation that they would
be more fair, less likely to exploit or threaten the remaining family members
for repayments, and also more likely to communicate in Kichwa, the regional
indigenous language.31 People contended that the community itself would
have greater leverage over the actions of this person because they lived in the
community.
Luis, a former president of a local indigenous organisation, provided
further insight on the history of migration and the impact on social inequal-
ities in the region. As we rode up to Laguna Culebrillas one afternoon for a
cultural tourism event, he commented that the recent appearance of indi-
genous moneylenders and coyotes had finally broken the legacy of former
landholding elites and merchant families exercising control over indigenous
Cañaris and peasant mestizos. Up to the early 1980s, most families subsisted
on the small plots of land granted through the agrarian reforms of the late
1960s and early 1970s and on supplemental work. As the economic and
political conditions worsened in the 1980s, migration to the United States
surged as families struggled to keep up with the exorbitant prices of basic
costs of living. He contended that the main cause for the economic hardship
was corruption among the ‘forty’ families who consistently held power since
the late 1800s. Corruption and inside connections were the driving force of
politics (of state) in this area and the rural families were the ones who
suffered the most.32 He also pointed out that most coyotes in the region
had deep roots in migration and were related to each other, going back to the
pioneer migrants. These migration predecessors had an easy journey, which
cost around 6,000 sucres (approximately 250 USD in late 1970s).33 Family
members continued their involvement until it became a family business, one
that depended on well-established personal connections.
Once indigenous coyotes started to take the stage, the older families no
longer had exclusive connections and the social dynamics began to change.
When men from the rural areas began migrating to the United States in the
mid-1980s, they would get dressed up before they visited the coyote in
Cuenca, which in many testimonials was a mestiza woman.34 I heard stories
like this numerous times from migrants who had made the trip or had family
members who had left, following the initial pioneers. Luis contended that the
coyotes had all the controls, playing an exclusive and privileged financial and
social role in the community. He further recounted that later elite urban
mestizos in Cañar and Zhud, a town just north of Cañar, began working in
the migration industry. However, the dynamics changed once people from
the rural areas became more connected in the migratory network.
When Raul, an older Cañari man, commented that there was a Cañari
coyote in the community, I asked how he might differ from mestizo coyotes;
he responded that primarily the difference was the language barrier for
monolingual Kichwa speakers who wanted to migrate. Most could not
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communicate with a mestizo and wouldn’t understand what was entailed in
the contract or what to expect in the journey. He pointed out astutely that
indigenous coyotes were more accountable to the community, as the ties were
still considered to be strong if the coyote continued to reside there. The
extended family and kin-networks (still identified through regionally identi-
fiable indigenous surnames) were thought to temper the possibility of exploi-
tation and abuse/threats by debt-holding moneylenders or coyotes. This
presents an interesting paradox, in which entrepreneurs in the migration
industry, coyotes and moneylenders were tolerated in the communities as
they are seen to be part of the social fabric, while the migrant families were
seen as contributing to the demise of social controls and community
cohesiveness.35 One compelling reason for this tolerance, as I was told, was
that coyotes serve an important role and people may eventually need their
services. Informal interviews conducted seven years later actually showed a
shift of perceptions of indigenous coyotes, who were now seen as discon-
nected from the community and engaged in exploitative relationships with
migrant families. In his research with Mexican migrants, Hernández-León
(2008) pointed to this social distancing as camionteros engaged in the for-
profit business.
I first met Juan in Quito, where he had helped recruit indigenous migrant
investors in a four-star hotel project in Cuenca; he was recently working on
his own housing complex in Cañar, Urbanización Cañar. Juan had played a
large role in the formation of the Pachakutik indigenous political party,36 but
had fallen out with the other organisers. Over the course of my first few
weeks in Cañar, Juan shared his background as a former teacher and taxi
driver, a dual career path that many teachers shared, as the teaching salary
could not sustain a household.37 He shared his story about the Pachakutic
party much later, when he told me that he had run to be a representative for
the region, but had lost due to negative campaigning by another candidate.
Apparently there were many disagreements and he no longer worked with
any of the organisations. He never elaborated more on the experience but at
the time Pachakutik was formed in 1995, Cañar was recently recovering from
a violent encounter between mestizo business owners and indigenous Cañaris
at the newly established cultural centre in the town centre.38 Tensions would
have been high. Juan was also working on a start-up magazine and had
a second housing development project closer to the coast. A few months
later, I learned he was also a well-known indigenous coyote.
One afternoon I met Juan and his wife Joséfina at the housing develop-
ment they were spearheading. Juan spent the day giving the investors (all
indigenous families) a tour of the construction site, which included a total of
thirty homes in three construction styles. Afterwards the families gathered
for a snack of soda and crackers and to review their payment history. His
wife, who kept the logbooks, reviewed each family’s monthly progress in
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their three-year payment plan. Many of the family members (mostly women)
had lapsed only a few months, but one woman in particular, who was trailed
by three children in tattered clothes, was told that she was almost eight
months behind in payments and was going to lose her share in the housing
development. She was very apologetic, but argued that her husband had
stopped sending money. Joséfina admonished her and said there was nothing
she could do. They argued back and forth until finally the woman left.
Having been witness to an uncommonly loud and bitter dispute, I realised
that not only did Juan and Joséfina have significant power over numerous
families through the development project, but that migrant households that
no longer received remittances could find themselves in an even more
precarious situation than before, especially when investments such as these
were disrupted and they had no other alternative. Obviously this woman had
diverted funds away from her household to pay for the investment and her
evident poverty made the loss of these funds even more difficult.
Juan’s history of employment and entrepreneurialism, as a teacher, taxi
driver, manager of a bus company (which I learned transported hopeful
migrants to the coast during midnight runs), active indigenous political
member, a potential entrepreneur in the Cuenca hotel project, to a coyote,
and housing development business owner, is impressive. It also shows the
diverse economic strategies that people employ in formal and informal
markets. In an interesting turn, the housing development, while evoking
nostalgic images of Incan and Cañari heritage through the name and promo-
tional materials, was equally sold as a modern neighbourhood touting all the
amenities and comforts of affluent lifestyles.
Conclusion
This article sought to outline ways in which indigenous identity figures in the
migration experience and also engage with the broader debate on undocu-
mented migration and on the role of ethnicity in shaping its development.
I’ve included accounts of indigenous migration from the communities of
origin and throughout the migration journey. The tragic story of Noemi
Alvarez Quillay is instructive as child migration continues to increase in
different regions of the world. What are the roles of intermediary institutions
in safeguarding the basic human rights of these vulnerable populations? How
do we understand the factors that shape the increase in migration despite the
risks of the clandestine migration routes? This article focuses on a particular
lens through which one can understand why and how indigenous migrants
employ different mobility strategies within the context of intersecting forms
of inequality. In all three testimonials, the men recounted a moment in which
they strategically passed as a member of another indigenous group in order
to avoid detention. Actors along the smuggling route would store clothing at
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safe houses along the route in order to facilitate this and recruited people of
these indigenous groups as transporters. The performance of indigenous
identity clearly becomes a mobility strategy which relies on the virtual
invisibility/legibility of indigenous people to trick oftentimes mono-lingual
mestizo migration officials.
Through employing the concept framing of a regional migration industry,
we can better outline the role of intermediary institutions and actors and the
impact they have on migration. But it is also important to understand
mobility strategies as part of a larger set of practices that have a historical
precedence. In southern highland Ecuador, regional migration, for labour
and as part of expansive trade routes, has been part of regional subsistence
strategies for many generations. At the community level, indigenous migrant
entrepreneurs, or migration merchants, have transformed economic and
social relationships between regional mestizos and indigenous peoples.
Kyle’s work highlighted that the rise of migration merchants could be seen
as a resurgence of ‘usurious’ middlemen that had played similar intermediary
roles in former economic periods.39 While participation in the regional
migration industry may open up possibilities for social mobility, indigenous
migration merchants still contend with discrimination from regional middle-
class merchants who disparage indigenous migration and visible markers of
economic success. In relation to how they contribute to migration, it is
difficult to quantify. However, in terms of migrant experiences, the presence
of local, community-based, coyotes has created a more direct migration route
from rural communities. The upsurge in child migration results from various
factors, however many of the parents participated in the rapid increase in
migration starting in the early 2000s. Over ten years later, the parents have
begun to send for the children they left behind, who are now young teen-
agers. The coyotes, located in these communities, are able to start the process
very quickly, and oftentimes these young adults will leave directly from the
grandparents’ (or primary caretakers’) home without having spent any time
in the cities or outside of their communities. This was very likely the case for
young Noemi.
While it is difficult to ascertain how often indigeneity helps forge broad-
reaching alliances in the migration route, there is definitely a growing
number of indigenous migration merchants in Cañar with the necessary
connections to facilitate migration. When the indigenous migrant mer-
chant in Mexico propositioned Santiago to work as ethnic colleagues in the
smuggling market, it presented an interesting case but was unique at the
time of the interviews. There are far more accounts of indigenous groups
being used as decoys, sent intentionally by human smugglers to be inter-
cepted intentionally by migration officials, in order to move other groups
of people over a different route. In this way, the possibility for ethnic
solidarity en route is overshadowed by the relatively disadvantaged
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position of mono-lingual or semi-bi-lingual indigenous people in the
migration route. Despite gains in social and economic mobility, the pre-
carious nature of clandestine migration and the vulnerability of undocu-
mented labourers in the global economy tethers indigenous households to
much larger fluctuations.
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